The main goal of this research was to analyze economic behaviors in the extraction of a limited common good and, to observe solidarity versus opportunistic behaviors, and the impacts of these individual behaviors at the group level.

We designed a simple game of individual extraction of a common good with high desirability and bounded that we called “the game of chocolates". Also, we developed an application protocol that considered individual extraction rounds and group discussion instances, plus one dynamics of self-observation at the end of the activity. Considering as theoretical references the behavioral experimental, institutional and elements of popular education.

Within the findings was systematically observed a context of self-organization - in the first rounds of individual extraction - many of the individuals uses a distributive and solidarity criterion in their decision and only appear some minority of opportunist individuals, who finally generates distributions asymmetric and over-extraction. Likewise, these behaviors are regulated with the generation of institutional instances of communication and generation of agreements between the participants, but once the communication instances are distanced the agreements are no longer respected and a few opportunists appear again. There are also differences by sex and age.